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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis of 2008-9 has sparked renewed interest - both in academic and
in policy circles - in understanding the cyclicality of employment and, in particular, the
link between nancial constraints, credit availability and employment. Recent research
has shown that nancing constraints a¤ect rm-level employment decisions (Benmelech
et al., 2011), and that rms which borrowed from less healthy banks or that tightened
debt capacity in the period preceding the crisis experienced a signicantly larger fall in
employment in the aftermath of the nancial crisis (see Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Green-
stone et al., 2014; Giroud and Mueller, 2015, for evidence on the US; and Bentolila et al.,
2016, for evidence on Spain).1
This paper investigates how the nancial crisis of 2008-9, and the resulting nancing
constraints imposed on rms, a¤ected rmsdecisions in terms of employment compos-
ition, when it is possible to choose between xed-term and permanent contracts when
hiring a worker. This question has received signicantly less attention from researchers.
Labor market responses to the crisis have been large in European labor markets, char-
acterized by a dual structure where exible xed-term contracts coexist with permanent
contracts with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). However, evidence on the
e¤ects of nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent crisis, on rmsdecisions
regarding the composition of employment and the mix between xed-term and permanent
workers is very scant.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers
in Portugal, and exploit the e¤ect of the 2008-9 crisis on rms with di¤erential precrisis
dependence on external nance as a quasi-natural experiment. We employ a di¤erence-
in-di¤erences identication strategy to study the e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion
of xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires at the rm level. We also estimate,
at the worker-level, how rmsnancing constraints a¤ect the probability of a worker
being hired with a temporary contract after the crisis.2 Portugal o¤ers a good setting
to study the use of xed-term contracts as they represent a signicant share of total
employment, averaging 15 percent over the period, one of the largest shares in the EU.
Importantly, strict EPL for permanent workers is accompanied by lax regulation of xed-
term employment.3
1Siemer (2014) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) exploit di¤erential nancing needs across industries,
and nd consistent evidence for rms in more nancially dependent industries in the US.
2Portuguese rms continued to hire workers over the period, averaging 442,000 new hires per year.
The average share of xed-term hires was above 60 percent (Table 1).
3Portugal is at the top of the OECD Employment Protection index, having the largest protection
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Understanding the e¤ect of nancial constraints on rmschoice between xed-term
and permanent contracts when hiring new workers is important given existing evidence
that an increased use of xed-term contracts has several adverse e¤ects. These include
increased employment volatility, lower wages of temporary workers as unions tend to pro-
tect the interests of permanent workers in the wage bargaining, and lower labor mobility
due to higher uncertainty. Moreover, higher turnover rates of xed-term workers may
reduce investment in rm-specic human capital and rmsprovision of training, with
potential negative e¤ects on labor productivity (see e.g., Dolado et al., 2002).
We nd that rms in industries with higher precrisis dependence on external nance
increased their share of xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires after the crisis,
relative to less nancially constrained rms. We control for growth opportunities (as in
Fisman and Love, 2007) and account for rmsunobserved characteristics, which absorb
any systematic di¤erences across rms with di¤erent degree of nancial dependence, and
for aggregate trends. Our results are robust to alternative measures of nancial vulner-
ability - such as the Rajan and Zingales (1998) external nance dependence measure, the
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index of nancial constraints and precrisis reliance on
short-term debt - and for di¤erent dependent variables to measure the share of xed-term
hires and employment within a rm.4
At the worker-level, we nd that workers hired by rms in nancially vulnerable
industries are more likely to be hired with a xed-term contract after the crisis, relative
to comparable workers hired by nancially unconstrained rms. These results control for
workersobservable and unobservable characteristics. Our ndings suggest that as a result
of nancing constraints and increased uncertainty, rms in more nancially dependent
industries increased their relative demand for the more exible xed-term employment
contracts after the crisis.
Our results can be interpreted within a framework such as Caggese and Cuñat (2008).
Assuming xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but the latter are
more productive, nancing frictions have two opposing e¤ects on the composition of
employment. On the one hand, nancially constrained rms require higher productivity
to increase the value of internally generated funds, leading to an increased demand for
the more productive permanent workers. On the other hand, increased uncertainty and
expectation of future nancing constraints lead to higher demand for the more exible
gap between permanent and xed-term contracts.
4Our results complement those in Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who nd evidence from survey data
for Italy over 1990-2000, that rms that self declared to be nancially constrained had higher shares of
xed-term workers.
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xed-term workers. Our nding that nancially constrained rms increased the share of
xed-term hires after the 2008-9 crisis suggests that they value more highly the exibility
of these workers to adjust future employment without incurring signicant ring costs.
This is particularly relevant in European labor markets where permanent workers are
highly protected while xed-term contracts have mild dismissal regulations.
The linked employer-employee data (LEED) that we use has unusually detailed in-
formation, including the workers gender, age, education, occupation, hours of work,
earnings, hiring date in the rm, and importantly for this study, the type of contract of
employment: whether xed-term or open-ended. Firm-level information includes total
sales, total employment, industry, location, number of establishments, legal and owner-
ship structures.
To identify credit supply e¤ects, we use industry-level measures of external nance
dependence, following the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) size-age index of nancial constraints, rmsreliance on short-term debt; as well
as asset tangibility, as in Braun (2003), and access to buyer-supplier credit, following
Fisman and Love (2003). These measures are computed from rmsbalance sheet and
employer-employee data over the period that precedes the crisis, to avoid changes in rm
behavior after the crisis to a¤ect the industry measures of nancial vulnerability.
By exploiting cross-industry di¤erences in precrisis nancial vulnerability measures,
which are intrinsic characteristics of an industry and exogenously determined from the
perspective of individual rms, we circumvent identication concerns in this type of study
of disentangling supply-side from demand-side changes in the credit market in response
to the crisis. To provide an additional test of our identication, we use the 2001 crisis
that originated in the ICT sector, and nd no statistically signicant relation between
nancial vulnerability and the relative use of xed-term employment contracts after the
crisis. Our results about the e¤ects of the 2008-9 crisis on xed-term employment within
rms are thus consistent with the role of shocks to credit supply and nancial constraints.
Our ndings have important policy implications. Empirical research has found that
xed-term workers earn lower wages and have repeated spells of unemployment. The
nding that the use of these contracts increased after the crisis suggests on the one
hand that their availability allowed rms to continue to hire in an uncertain environment
given their exibility. On the other hand, it may uncover additional costs of the shock
with potential long-term e¤ects in terms of decreased accumulation of human capital
and productivity. This is particularly relevant in labor markets characterized by a dual
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employment structure.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data used, the construction of the main variables and the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the results on the e¤ect of nancing constraints
on employment composition within rms after the crisis, and on workersprobability of a
xed-term employment contract. Section 5 discusses the interpretation and implications
of our results. The last section concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to recent studies on how nancial shocks a¤ect employment de-
cisions of rms. Chodorow-Reich (2014), uses employment data from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) and the borrowing history of rms that accessed the syndicated
loan market, to study the e¤ect of bank lending frictions during the 2008-9 crisis on em-
ployment. He nds that rms which had borrowed from less healthy nancial institutions
before the crisis had lower probability of obtaining a loan after the crisis and reduced
employment by more, relative to rms that borrowed from healthier lenders before the
crisis. Greenstone et al. (2014) nd that the withdrawal of lending to small rms ac-
counted for statistically signicant negative e¤ects on U.S. county-level employment after
the 2008-9 crisis. These results are consistent with the idea that smaller rms are more
vulnerable to credit supply constraints due to problems of asymmetric information and
reduced transparency (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
Using a similar approach, but focusing on Spain, Bentolila et al. (2016) study em-
ployment changes from 2006 to 2010 for rms that obtained a signicant share of funding
from Spanish banks that were bailed out by the government as a result of the nancial
crisis, relative to rms that borrowed from healthier banks. They nd that rms which
borrowed from weak banks su¤ered a signicantly larger fall in employment. Benmelech
et al. (2011) exploit as quasi-experiments the variation in the amount of maturing debt,
the bank deregulation in the U.S., and the contraction of loans by Japanese a¢ liate banks
in the U.S. during the 1990s. They show that labor is sensitive to nancial constraints
and that the provision of bank credit a¤ects unemployment, suggesting that nance plays
an important role in rm-level employment decisions.
Siemer (2014) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) rely on an identication strategy sim-
ilar to that employed in this paper by exploiting di¤erences across sectors in external
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nance dependence. Siemer (2014) uses data from the BLS and nds that small and
young rms in sectors with high dependence on external nance had lower employment
growth following the 2008 crisis than rms in sectors with low external nance depend-
ence. He also develops a heterogeneous rm model with endogenous rm entry and
nancial constraints to study the e¤ect of a nancial shock on small and young rms.
Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) also use BLS data and exploit industry-level external n-
ance dependence - the proportion of capital expenditures nanced with external funds -
to study transitions from employment to unemployment at the worker-level during the
2008-9 crisis. They nd that the probability of becoming unemployed during the nancial
crisis is higher for workers in industries with high external nance dependence, relative
to those in industries with low dependence.
Our paper is distinct from previous studies given our focus on the e¤ect of the crisis
on the relative use of xed-term versus permanent workers at the rm-level, rather than
on total employment e¤ects. We also investigate the e¤ect of nancing constraints on the
probability of a worker being hired with a xed-term contract following the crisis. The
main contribution of this paper is thus to study how nancing constraints a¤ect rms
decision to hire xed-term or permanent workers following shocks to credit supply. This
is of particular importance given rigidities in European labor markets.
Previous research has studied how employment protection a¤ects employment dynam-
ics, and in particular the use of xed-term and permanent employment contracts (e.g.
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1992). Focussing predominantly
on Europe, where reforms to labor laws regulating xed-term contracts allowed such stud-
ies, empirical research has found that xed-term employment absorbs a higher share of
output volatility and increases overall employment volatility. The e¤ects on unemploy-
ment are found to be largely ambiguous (see e.g., Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Dolado
et al., 2002; Kugler and Pica, 2004; Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005). Holmlund and Storrie
(2002) show that the share of xed-term work in total employment in Sweden increased
markedly following the 1990s recession. They document that xed-term employment
increased over most of the period, and the decline in employment during the downturn
was the result of job losses of permanent workers. Bentolila et al. (2012) argue that the
larger increase in unemployment in Spain compared to France after the nancial crisis of
2008 can be explained by the larger dismissal costs of permanent workers and the laxer
rules on the use of temporary contracts.5
5A literature on business cycle uctuations and labor adjustment documents a negative correlation
between hours and employment growth (Cooper et al., 2007; Trapeznikova, 2014). Borowczyk-Martins
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Those studies do not address the link between nancing constraints and rmsrelative
use of xed-term contracts. As such, our paper is more closely related and complements
the results in Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who study the interaction between nancing
constraints and the employment decision of rms to hire xed-term or permanent workers.
The authors develop a model in which nancing constraints are an important determ-
inant of the optimal mix between xed-term and permanent employment. They test
the models predictions empirically using survey data for a sample of small and medium
Italian manufacturing rms from 1995 to 2000. Their measure of nancing constraints
is based on qualitative survey answers where rms self-declare as nancially constrained.
We instead exploit variation across industries in external nance dependence and the
2008-9 nancial crisis as a quasi-experiment. We identify a causal link between rmsn-
ancing conditions and the share of xed-term hiring contracts, using data for the universe
of private sector rms.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate how the global nancial crisis of 2008-9 and the subsequent nancing
constraints a¤ect rms decision to hire temporary or permanent workers. The main
data source used in this paper is the Portuguese linked employer-employee data Quadros
de Pessoal (QP), for the period from 2002 through 2012. These data have been collected
annually since the 1980s by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Security. The
data include information on all private sector rms that employ at least one worker, and
on all of their plants and all of their employees. Firms are required by law to answer the
survey and to have it publicly available at the workplace. This ensures a high degree of
coverage and reliability of the data. Each rm and each worker has a unique registration
number which allows them to be traced over time.
Firm-level information includes the rms year of creation, industry, region, total
number of workers, number of establishments, sales volume, legal structure and owner-
ship type (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or foreign). Our analysis
and Lalé (2016) establish that the reduction in hours per worker following the 2008-9 crisis is largely
driven by changes in the part-time employment share. We instead study rmsdecision to hire xed-
term workers following the crisis as they o¤er exibility to adjust future employment. In the Portuguese
economy both xed-term and permanent workers are predominantly on full-time jobs (over 95 percent
of the total during the period).
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considers rms in the manufacturing and services sectors. Information on workers in-
cludes gender, age, schooling, level of skill, occupation, monthly hours of work (normal
and overtime), earnings, hiring date in the rm, date of the last promotion and type
of employment contract. Importantly for this study, the variable "type of employment
contract" allows us to identify whether the worker is employed with a permanent (open-
ended) or with a xed-term contract; this variable has been collected since 2000. We use
the terms "temporary" and "xed-term" interchangeably throughout the paper.
Fixed-term contracts are regulated in the Portuguese law since 1989 (Decree-law 64-
A/1989). The law was amended over the years and included in the Labor Code (LC)
approved in 2003 (Law 99/2003).6 Despite the amendments to the labor law, there
have been no signicant changes regarding xed-term or permanent contracts during the
period covered by our analysis; in particular in the maximum duration, severance pay, or
procedures to terminate a xed-term contract. By law, xed-term employment contracts
are intended to full rmstemporary work needs and in general cannot exceed three
years of duration and can be renewed at the most three times.7 Fixed-term workers are
entitled to severance pay equal to 3 days for each month of employment (2 days if the
employment relationship lasted less than six months). Severance pay was changed to 20
days for each year of employment for new contracts from 2012. The dismissal advance
notice period remained at 15 days. The law that regulates xed-term contracts is applied
to all qualications and occupations and across all rms and industries.8
The severance pay for open-ended contracts is one month for each year of seniority (20
days from 2012), with a minimum of 3 months; and the advance notice period is at least
2 months.9 But the largest di¤erence between the two types of employment contract is in
the bureaucratic and monetary costs to terminate a contract, which are very signicant for
permanent contracts, involving court procedures, legal and administrative costs. Portugal
has the highest value of the OECD employment protection index for permanent contracts
throughout the period of our analysis (the U.S. have the lowest value).
6Parts of the LC were subject to changes over the following years, and a new LC was approved in
2009 (Law 7/2009), and revised in 2011 (Law 53/2011).
7If these limits are reached, the rm would have to either dismiss the workers or move them to an
open-ended contract. The rationale for this is that if the employment relation reaches the maximum
legal limit, the rms requirement would be for a permanent rather than for a temporary worker.
8The general law in the Labor Code can be overruled by Instruments of Collective Regulation of
Labor (IRCT) - agreements signed by unions and employers a¤ecting workers employed in the particular
industry or rm for which the agreement is established (depending on the instrument). However, IRCTs
override the Labor Code only if they establish more favorable conditions to the workers (Principle of the
most favorable treatment, Labor Code, art. 4, 2003; art. 476, 2009).
9This was changed from 2010 to 15 days if seniority is less than a year; 30 days if it is between 1 and
5 years; 60 days if between 5 and 10 years; and 75 days if it is 10 years or more.
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Table 1 shows the total number of permanent and xed-term workers hired in each
year over the period. Portuguese rms hired on average 442,000 workers, and on average
62 percent of new hires were under a xed-term contract. Appendix Table A.1 reports
summary statistics for xed-term employment shares at the rm-level for the rms in our
estimation samples. Fixed-term contracts represent a signicant share of total employ-
ment, averaging 15 percent over the period (column 2). Portugal has the third largest
share of xed-term employment of the European Union, below Spain and Poland (OECD,
2012). The proportion of xed-term employment increased after the crisis, and in 2009
it was above 17 percent.
[Table 1 about here]
Our main goal is to investigate whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the
proportion of xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires for nancially constrained
rms. Therefore, the main rm-level dependent variables in our specications are the
share of xed-term hires in total hires and the ratio of xed-term over permanent hires.
We also use as alternative dependent variables the shares of xed-term or permanent hires
in total rm employment. In some of our specications, we use the share of xed-term
workers in total employment and the ratio of xed-term over permanent employment.
Appendix Table A.1 reports summary statistics for these variables.
We identify permanent and xed-term hires by combining information in the QP
data on the workers"type of employment contract" and "hiring date" in the rm. For
each rm-year we then compute the number of new hires with a xed-term employment
contract and the number of hires with a permanent employment contract to obtain the
shares of xed-term new hires within a rm. As shown in Table A.1, the share of hires
with xed-term contract in total hires averaged 54 percent across rm-years (column 4).
This share increased after the crisis, reaching 59 percent in 2009.
We use rms balance sheet data collected by the Portuguese O¢ ce for National
Statistics (INE) to compute the measures of nancial dependence. From 2004 the data is
from Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE, Enterprise Integrated Accounts
System) and covers the universe of rms in manufacturing and services. Prior to 2004,
INE implemented the Inquérito às Empresas Harmonizado (IEH, Harmonized Enterprise
Survey), a representative annual survey covering around 40,000 rms. Together, the SCIE
and the IEH provide detailed rm balance sheet information, which we use to construct
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the measures of nancial vulnerability, described in more detail below. We then merge the
matched employer-employee data with the measures of nancial dependence. Appendix
Table A.2 reports summary statistics for the alternative dependent variables and for all
the covariates included in our rm-level specications.
3.2 Measures of nancial constraints
We require measures of nancial dependence to identify di¤erential e¤ects of the crisis for
nancially constrained rms. Our empirical strategy exploits di¤erences in vulnerability
to credit availability across industries and uses the global nancial crisis of 2008-9 as a
shock to credit supply. Previous research has shown that some industries are more n-
ancially dependent than others. First, rms in some industries have substantially larger
liquidity needs, for example, because of the initial project scale, the requirement for con-
tinuing investment, or the cash harvest period (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; RZ hereafter).
As discussed in RZ, technological di¤erences across industries in their dependence on
external nance reect intrinsic properties of the industries and persist across countries
and time. Second, rms in sectors that are intrinsically associated with more tangible
(harder) assets can pledge more collateral to access external funds (Braun, 2003; Claes-
sens and Laeven, 2003). Third, rms in some industries receive more trade credit from
suppliers, which can reduce dependence on credit from nancial institutions (Fisman and
Love, 2003). More recently, Hadlock and Pierce (2010, HP hereafter) proposed a size-age
index of nancial constraints, based on the nding that rmssize and age are highly
related to nancial constraints.
We use the common proxies for a sectors nancial vulnerability: external nance
dependence, asset tangibility, and the importance of trade credit, as well as the HP
size-age index and precrisis reliance on short-term debt. We compute industry meas-
ures of nancial vulnerability using balance sheet data, from the SCIE and the IEH, and
employer-employee data for Portuguese rms. The measures are obtained for the period
preceding the crisis, so that the e¤ect of the nancial crisis on rm behavior does not
contaminate the industry measures of nancial vulnerability. We follow the literature in
computing the measures of liquidity and tangibility. We rst calculate nancial vulner-
ability at the rm-level as an average measure over the precrisis period (1997-2006) for
all rms in the data.10 We then use the median value across all rms within a 2-digit
10Restricting the precrisis period to 2004-2006, when the SCIE data covers the universe of rms, does
not a¤ect the results. As discussed in the literature, these measures tend to be stable over time, and
display much larger variation across industries than across rms within a given industry.
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ISIC rev 3.1 industry as the measure of nancial dependence.
External nance dependence (extfin) is measured by the share of total capital ex-
penditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations. Asset tangibility
(tang) is the share of net plant, property and equipment in total book value assets. The
measure of trade credit (tcred) is the ratio of total accounts payable over total cost of
goods sold, following Love et al. (2007).11 This reects access to credit that rms re-
ceive from suppliers instead of making up-front payments for supplies. These industry
measures are widely regarded as technologically determined characteristics of an industry,
intrinsic to the industry and exogenous from the perspective of an individual rm. In
particular, the RZ measure of external nance dependence has been extensively used in
the literature.12
We obtain the size-age index (SA) of nancial constraints for the rms in our sample as
in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Size is measured by the log of ination adjusted book assets
and age is the number of years of the rm.13 The index shows that nancial constraints
fall as young and small rms mature and grow. Finally, we also use rms precrisis
reliance on short-term debt to measure nancial vulnerability. Firms that rely more
heavily on short-term debt during the precrisis period are more likely to be vulnerable
to the crisis, relative to rms with more long-term debt, since following the crisis banks
are less able to roll over short-term debt. We compute average precrisis short-term debt
ratios (short-term debt/total debt) at the rm-level from rmsbalance sheet data.14
Fisman and Love (2007) argue that the RZ measure may capture rms growth op-
portunities, such that rms on a steeper growth trajectory would be more dependent on
external nance than those at a more mature stage of their life cycle. In that case, the
measure may implicitly reect how nancial institutions allow rms to respond to shocks
to growth opportunities, rather than allowing them to grow in industries with higher n-
11This measure is computed over 2006-2007 because the data distinguishes rmscredit from suppliers
only since 2006.
12Examples of studies that employ the same methodology include Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) and
Siemer (2014) to investigate unemployment dynamics during the 2008 global crisis; Chava and Purnanan-
dam (2011) on the e¤ect of shocks to the U.S. banking system on bank-dependent borrowers; Claessens
and Laeven (2003) on the relation between nancial development, property rights protection and growth;
among many other.
13HP estimate ordered logit models, for the sample of rms in Compustat, where a rms qualitatively
determined nancial constraint status is modeled as a function of size and age. The authors then use
the estimates on size and age to create the SA index of nancial constraints. The HP index is calculated
as (-0.737Size) + (0.043Size2) - (0.040Age). Size is winsorized (capped) at $4.1 billion, and age at
37 years to reect a at relation between nancial constraints and these variables for very large/mature
rms. By construction, nancially more constrained rms have higher SA index.
14The HP SA index and the short-term debt ratios are computed over the 2002-2006 period, as data
coverage is larger for these measures from 2002. All of the results remain robust to using the 1997-2006
period to compute these average measures.
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ancial dependence. They test this conjecture by including an industry-level sales growth
interaction in the Rajan and Zingalesoriginal specication. They nd that this growth
measure is statistically signicant, emphasizing the role of global growth opportunities.
Therefore, to take into account rmsgrowth in the precrisis period, we follow Fisman
and Love (2007) and include a sales growth interaction in our empirical specications.
The real sales growth measure is obtained following the same RZ methodology as for the
other nancial vulnerability measures. We compute average real sales growth over the
precrisis period for each rm and then take the industry-level median of the rm-level
sales growth rates.15
To identify di¤erential e¤ects of the crisis for nancially constrained rms, we split the
sample into rms with high and low nancing constraints, dening dichotomous variables
for whether the industry measures of nancial dependence are above the median across
industries. Splitting rms based on a-priori measures of nancial constraints has been
employed in several previous studies (e.g., Acharya et al., 2012; Duygan-Bump, 2015;
Giroud and Mueller, 2015; among others). Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 report summary
statistics for the continuous measures and for the above-median dichotomous measures of
nancial constraints, in our rm-level and worker-level estimation samples, respectively.
To estimate the e¤ect of the crisis for rms with di¤erent degrees of nancial depend-
ence, we identify the global nancial crisis period by dening a binary variable, Crisis,
which takes the value of 1 from 2008 onwards and zero otherwise. September 2008 is
generally considered as the onset of the crisis. In July 2007, the interbank market in-
terest rate increased following the announcement by the French bank BNP Paribas of the
freezing of three investment funds based on the impossibility to value its subprime assets.
Other banks followed in freezing their subprime portfolios. In March 2008, the with-
drawal of short-term nancing to Bear Stearns led to its sale to J.P. Morgan. Financial
conditions then stabilized temporarily, but deteriorated severely in September 2008 with
Lehman Brothers reports of losses and subsequent bankruptcy after not being able to
obtain short-term nancing or to nd a buyer. Several other major nancial institution
failures and bailouts triggered a sharp escalation in the global credit crunch. The cost of
interbank lending soared as a result (see Chor and Manova, 2012; and Chodorow-Reich,
2014, for details).16
15Real sales growth is computed over the 2002-2006 period, as for the HP SA index and short-term
debt ratios.
16The onset of the crisis in Portugal was also 2008. The Portuguese economy experienced an expansion
from 2004 to 2007, in which GDP grew at an average rate of 1.66%. Then the recession started in 2008
and GDP fell by 3% between 2008 and 2009; it recovered temporarily in 2010 and then continued to
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3.3 Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between nancing constraints and the employment decisions
of rms with respect to the use xed-term or permanent employment contracts after
the crisis, we implement a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach. The aim is to investigate
whether rms in industries with high nancial constraints increase their share of xed-
term hires disproportionately after the crisis, compared to rms in industries with low
nancial vulnerability, since the nancial crisis reduced the availability of external credit.
Hence, we estimate specications of the form:
Yjst = 1(Crisist  FinV ulns) + 2(Crisist  Salesgs) + X 0jt + dj + dt + jst: (1)
where the dependent variable, Yjst, is the employment level or, most importantly, the
share of xed-term workers hired in total or permanent hires (or employment) of rm j
in industry s, and year t. Crisist is an indicator variable for the crisis period, taking the
value 1 from 2008 onwards, and 0 otherwise. September 2008 is generally considered as
the onset of the crisis, as discussed above.
FinV ulns is one of the measures of nancial constraints for industry s: external
nance dependence, the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size-age index of nancial constraints,
short-term debt ratios, access to trade credit, and tangible asset shares. To estimate
di¤erential e¤ects for the more nancially constrained rms, we use dummy variables that
take the value of 1 if industry s is above the median for the respective FinV uln measure,
and zero otherwise (FinV ulnab-med). The strategy of dividing rms in two groups, with
below-median and above-median nancial dependence measures, respectively, has been
employed in previous studies (see e.g. Giroud and Mueller, 2014; Duygan-Bump et al.,
2015).
The coe¢ cient of main interest, 1, is interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of the
crisis for rms in industries with above-median nancial dependence precrisis, relative to
rms in industries below the median. Our results remain robust to using the continuous
measures of nancial constraints. Salesgs is the measure of the industrys precrisis real
sales growth. We include its interaction term to control for the fact that the measures of
external nance dependence may capture rmsgrowth opportunities, such that rms on
a steep growth trajectory may be more dependent on external nance (see Fisman and
decline from 2010 to 2012, by 3%. These recession periods coincide with those reported for the UK and
most European countries by the Economic Cycle Research Institute, and correspond to the so called
"double-dip" recession. GDP decreased on average 1.35% per year from 2008 to 2012 in Portugal (World
Bank, World Development Indicators).
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Love, 2007). Similar to the FinV uln measures, we dene a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the sector is above the median in terms of precrisis sales growth, and
zero otherwise.
X 0jt is a vector of rm characteristics, such as lagged (ln of) sales (in real terms), legal
structure, whether the rm is foreign-owned or multiplant. We also include sets of xed
e¤ects to control for general trends, dt, and for rm time-invariant unobserved character-
istics, dj, which may a¤ect rmsmix between xed-term and permanent workers. When
we include year dummies and rm xed e¤ects, the stand-alone crisis dummy variable,
Crisist, and the FinV ulns measure are absorbed by these sets of xed e¤ects, and are
therefore not included. jst is a random disturbance term. In all empirical specications,
standard errors are clustered by rm.
Given the xed e¤ects and covariates included, the coe¢ cient of interest, on the
interaction between the crisis dummy and the nancial dependence measure, Crisist 
FinV ulns, is interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of xed-
term hires for rms in industries with above-median nancial dependence, relative to rms
in other industries (after controlling for precrisis growth). We expect the coe¢ cient on
the external nance dependence interaction to be positive if rms in industries that rely
more on external funds increased the share of xed-term hires disproportionately after
the crisis. Similarly, we expect the coe¢ cient on the HP size-age index interaction and
that on the short-term debt ratio interaction to be positive if higher nancial constraints,
measured by those variables, are associated with an increased relative use of xed-term
workers after the crisis.
Regarding the measure of client-supplier (trade) credit, on the one hand this type of
credit may have been an alternative to credit from nancial institutions, alleviating the
e¤ects of the crisis.17 On the other hand, nancially vulnerable rms may be less willing
to extend trade credit to their clients after the nancial crisis, propagating its e¤ects
through credit networks (Love et al., 2007). Therefore, the coe¢ cient could be positive
or negative. The coe¢ cient on the asset tangibility interaction is expected to be negative
if rms are able to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external nance after the
crisis. However, the 2008 nancial crisis was accompanied by a sharp decline in the value
of commercial real estate holdings of rms. This may have amplied the e¤ects of the
nancial shock for rms dependent on pledgeable assets to access external nancing. For
17Fisman and Love (2003) show that industries with higher dependence on trade credit have higher
growth rates in countries with weaker nancial institutions, suggesting that it may provide an alternative
to bank credit.
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example, Kleiner (2015) shows that the decline of the housing sector explains 10 percent
of the 2007-9 unemployment in the UK.18 Therefore, given the issues associated with the
measures of tangibility and trade credit after the 2008-9 crisis, our preferred measures of
nancial constraints are the external nance dependence, once precrisis sales growth is
accounted for, the HP SA index and the reliance on short-term debt.
We also use data at the worker-level to investigate whether workers hired by rms in
industries with higher nancial vulnerability were more likely to be hired with a tempor-
ary employment contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers hired by rms
with lower nancial vulnerability. To that end, using the sample of workers that were
hired during the period of our analysis, we estimate a linear model for the probability
that a worker is hired with a xed-term employment contract. That is, we estimate the
following specication:
Pr[fixed-termijst] = 1(Crisist  FinV ulns) + 2(Crisist  Salesgs) + Z 0it
+X 0jt + d(:) + ijst (2)
where the dependent variable is the probability of a xed-term hiring contract. The
estimation sample includes observations for each worker only for the years when the
worker is newly hired by a rm. Therefore, fixed-termijst is equal to one if worker i
was hired by rm j (in industry s) in year t with a xed-term contract, and is equal
to zero if the worker was hired with a permanent contract. Zit is a vector of worker
characteristics, including the workersgender, level of education attained, potential labor
market experience (and its square), level of skill, and whether the worker is a foreign
national.
Xjt is a vector of rm characteristics, as before. We also include sets of xed ef-
fects, d(:), to control for general trends, as well as for rm or worker time-invariant
unobserved characteristics. Because some workers were hired more than once over the
period, we are able to estimate specications that control for worker xed e¤ects. The
other variables are as dened above. The coe¢ cient of interest, on the interaction term
Crisis  FinV uln, captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the probability of a
xed-term hiring contract, for workers hired by rms in industries with above-median
nancial constraints, relative to those hired by other rms, controlling for all workers
18Ersahin and Irani (2015) also show that there is a positive relation between real estate price growth
and rm employment.
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and rmscharacteristics, including sales growth.
4 Results
4.1 E¤ect of the crisis on rmstotal employment
We start by investigating the e¤ect of the 2008-9 crisis on rm total employment. We
regress the log of employment at the rm-year level on the crisis dummy variable, Crisist.
We control for industry or rm xed e¤ects to absorb any systematic di¤erences across
industries or rms that may a¤ect employment outcomes. The results are reported in
Table 2. We nd that rm-level employment declined after the crisis, both within rms
and across rms within an industry. These results are consistent with recent studies
that document overall employment decreases after the crisis (e.g. Chodorow-Reich, 2014;
Greenstone et al., 2014).
[Table 2 about here]
Next, we assess whether there are di¤erential employment e¤ects for rms in industries
with intrinsically higher external nance dependence, SA index, short-term debt ratios,
lower dependence on trade credit, or lower shares of collateralizable assets. We estimate
a specication similar to Eq. (1), with the log of employment as the dependent variable.
The results are reported in Table 3. Even-numbered columns control for precrisis sales
growth, as explained in the previous section. All columns include rm xed e¤ects,
thus controlling for unobserved rm characteristics, and in particular for any systematic
di¤erences across rms in the treatment and control groups. The coe¢ cient of interest is
that on the interaction Crisist  FinV ulnab-med, which is interpreted as the di¤erential
e¤ect of the crisis on employment for rms in industries with above-median nancial
dependence, relative to those in industries below-median. The stand-alone FinV ulnab-med
term is absorbed by the rm xed e¤ects. In Panel A we include the stand-alone Crisis
variable for a more clear interpretation of the e¤ect of the crisis, whilst in Panel B we
control for year xed-e¤ects which account for global trends, a¤ecting all rms, and thus
absorb the stand-alone Crisis variable. The results remain robust in both panels.
We nd that rm employment was reduced after the crisis on average, while rms in
industries with above-median dependence on external nance, SA index or precrisis reli-
ance on short-term debt reduced employment by less compared to other rms. The coef-
cients on the interaction term between the crisis dummy and the nancial dependence
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measures reported in columns (1) through (6) of the table are positive and statistically
signicant. A hypothesis to explain this result is that since rms with higher nancing
needs require greater productivity to increase the value of internally generated funds, they
used the more productive permanent workers more intensively before the crisis.19 As a
result, in a labor market with strict employment protection legislation against dismissal
of permanent workers, the overall employment e¤ects of the crisis would have been less
pronounced. We provide evidence for this hypothesis below.
Columns (7) through (10) of Table 3 report results for the importance of buyer-supplier
credit (tcred) and asset tangibility (tang) as (potentially inverse) measures of nancial
vulnerability. We nd that rms in industries with above-median tangible asset shares or
access to trade credit experienced a larger reduction in employment after the crisis relative
to other rms. As discussed above, credit constrained upstream rms may have been less
willing to extend credit to their clients after the crisis thus propagating its e¤ects through
client-supplier networks and magnifying the employment e¤ects (see Love et al., 2007).
Moreover, rmsability to use tangible assets as collateral to obtain external nance may
have been dampened by the sharp decline in the value of commercial real estate holdings
of rms following the collateral shocks (see Kleiner, 2015). Given the issues associated
with using asset tangibility and trade credit as inverse measures of nancial vulnerability
in the context of the 2008-9 crisis, our preferred measures of nancial constraints are
extfin, the HP SA index, and reliance on short-term debt. In the following sections we
focus on those measures to investigate the role of nancial vulnerability on the relative
use of xed-term labor after the crisis.
[Table 3 about here]
Appendix Table A.4 provides evidence for the hypothesis discussed above that nan-
cially constrained rms hired more permanent workers prior to the crisis and given strict
EPL for these workers, decreased employment by less in the aftermath of the crisis. We
regress the precrisis average share of permanent hires in total employment at the rm
level on the measures of nancial vulnerability. We control for rm characteristics and
for the real sales growth measure, as before. Continuous measures of nancial vulner-
ability are used in odd-numbered columns and the indicator variables for above-median
19In Section 5 below, we report evidence that larger shares of xed-term workers are associated
with lower sales per worker within rms, suggesting that xed-term workers are less productive than
permanent workers.
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vulnerability in even-numbered columns. We obtain positive and statistically signicant
coe¢ cients on the three measures of nancial constraints.20 That is, over the precrisis
period rms with higher or above-median nancial vulnerability had higher shares of
permanent workers.
Since the crisis was largely unanticipated, nancially constrained rms had an incent-
ive to hire the more productive permanent workers to increase the value of internally
generated funds. The high dismissal costs and strict employment protection laws for
permanent workers may have resulted in rms hoarding these workers and experiencing
a lower decrease in employment after the crisis. This could have induced nancially
constrained rms to increase the share of xed-term hires after the crisis in order to re-
tain exibility to adjust future employment. We investigate how the crisis a¤ected the
proportion of xed-term hiring for nancially constrained rms in the remainder of the
paper.
4.2 E¤ect of the crisis on xed-term employment: rm-level
This section presents the main results of the paper. We are interested in identifying how
nancial constraints a¤ected rmsdecision to hire xed-term versus permanent work-
ers after the crisis, and thus the share of xed-term hires and employment within rms.
We investigate whether rms in more nancially vulnerable industries hire a larger pro-
portion of xed-term workers with respect to permanent workers after the crisis, given
the increased uncertainty and the exibility of xed-term contracts to adjust future em-
ployment. To that end, we estimate Eq. (1) using alternative dependent variables to
measure the proportion of xed-term hiring contracts within a rm. We use information
in the matched employer-employee data on each workers hiring date in the rm, and on
their "type of employment contract" (xed-term or permanent) to compute the shares of
xed-term new hires at the rm-year level.21
Table 4 reports results from estimating Eq. (1) for two alternative dependent vari-
ables: the share of xed-term workers hired in total new hires by the rm (Panel A), and
the ratio of xed-term to permanent new hires (Panel B). In odd-numbered columns
we include the interaction term of main interest, Crisist  FinV ulns, and in even-
numbered columns we additionally include the interaction with precrisis real sales growth,
20Except when using the indicator variable for the short-term debt ratio (column 6).
21In addition to xed-term and permanent contracts, the variable "type of employment contract"
includes the categories: "other" and "ingnored". We exclude from our analysis observations in those
categories, which account for only about 1% of observations.
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CrisistSalesgs. The latter accounts for rmsgrowth opportunities, which might oth-
erwise be captured by the external nance dependence measure (see Fisman and Love,
2007). We also control for rm and year xed-e¤ects in all specications, and for rms
observable characteristics, as discussed in previous sections. The standard errors are
always clustered by rm.
In Panel A of Table 4 we obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient
on the Crisist  FinV ulns interaction for the measure of external nance dependence
(column 1). That is, after the crisis rms with above-median dependence on external
nance increase the proportion of xed-term hires in total hires relative to rms with
below-median dependence. This result is obtained when controlling for rm xed e¤ects,
which absorb any di¤erential hiring preferences and policies of rms, as well as any
other unobserved rm characteristics. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is economically
signicant, implying a di¤erential increase of 1.6 percentage points in the share of xed-
term hires for rms with above-median dependence on external nance, relative to other
rms. This corresponds to a 2.9 percent increase relative to the sample mean of 54.4
percent, reported in Table A.2. Controlling for precrisis real sales growth does not a¤ect
the sign, magnitude and statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient on the external nance
dependence interaction (column 2).
These results are obtained both across rms within an industry and within rms after
the onset of the nancial crisis.22 The nding that nancially constrained rms increase
the share of xed-term hires in total hires following the crisis suggests that they value
more highly the exibility of the xed-term contracts than unconstrained rms. To deal
with increased uncertainty and expectation of future nancing constraints, those rms
hire a larger proportion of xed-term workers, as they o¤er greater exibility to adjust
employment following a negative shock, given the lower ring costs associated with this
type of contract.
[Table 4 about here]
The remaining columns of Table 4 report results for the two additional measures
of nancial constraints: the HP size-age index (columns 3-4) and the short-term debt
22Results with industry xed e¤ects instead of rm xed e¤ects, and including all other controls and
xed-e¤ects, are reported in appendix Table A.5. As shown, the results remain robust; we continue
to obtain positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the interaction terms of main interest.
That is, nancially constrained rms increased the share of xed-term hires after the crisis, relative to
unconstrained rms.
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ratio (columns 5-6). The SA index captures the fact that nancial constraints fall as
young and small rms mature and grow. By construction more nancially constrained
rms have higher SA index. The short-term debt ratio captures the fact that rms with
high precrisis reliance on short-term debt are more likely to be vulnerable to the crisis.
We continue to obtain positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cients on the interaction
term of main interest for both these measures. This shows that rms in industries with
above-median SA index or reliance on short-term debt precrisis experienced a larger
e¤ect of the crisis on the proportion of xed-term hires, relative to other rms. Again,
controlling for precrisis sales growth does not signicantly a¤ect the coe¢ cient on the
Crisist  FinV ulns interaction.
Panel B of Table 4 uses as dependent variable the ratio of xed-term over permanent
hires at the rm-year level, conditional on rms hiring permanent workers. The results
are consistent with those reported in Panel A. In particular, we continue to nd a positive
and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the CrisistFinV ulns interaction for the three
measures of nancial vulnerability. That is, rms with above-median reliance on external
nance, short-term debt or SA index increase the proportion of xed-term hires with
respect to permanent hires after the crisis, relative to rms below-median.
Next, we try to disentangle whether the positive e¤ect on the share of xed-term
hiring reported above is driven by an increase in xed-term hires, or by a reduction in
permanent hiring after the crisis. To that end, Table 5 reports results from estimating
Eq. (1) using four alternative dependent variables: the ratio of xed-term hires over
total employment, the ratio of permanent hires over total employment and the number
of workers hired with a xed-term and with a permanent contract, at the rm-year level.
Results for the three measures of nancial constraints are reported across the columns
of the table. Even-numbered columns report results that control for the precrisis sales
growth interaction. Panel A shows that there is a positive and statistically signicant
di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires in total employment for
rms with above-median nancial dependence, relative to those below-median. This is
found for all measures of nancial vulnerability.
[Table 5 about here]
The dependent variable in Panel B is the share of permanent hires in total employ-
ment. The di¤erential e¤ect of the crisis for rms with above-median dependence on
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external nance is not statistically signicant (columns 1 and 2). This nding suggests
that the positive e¤ect estimated above for the share of xed-term hires in total hires is
driven by a relative increase in xed-term hiring, while there is no statistically signicant
e¤ect on the share of permanent hires. The results for the two alternative FinV ulns
measures are mixed, with negative coe¢ cients estimated for the SA index and posit-
ive for the short-term debt ratios. The results reported in Panel C, for the number of
xed-term hires, show that rms in industries with above-median nancial constraints
increased the number of xed-term workers hired after the crisis, relative to rms be-
low the median. The coe¢ cients are statistically signicant for all measures except the
SA index. In Panel D, for the number of permanent hires, the coe¢ cients are generally
statistically insignicant (at the 5% level) when we include the sales growth interaction,
except for the SA index. Overall, the results in Table 5 conrm that the positive e¤ect
on xed-term hiring shares is driven by an increase in xed-term hires.
Table 6 reports results for the e¤ect on the stock of xed-term workers rather than
on the ow of new hiring. The dependent variable is the share of xed-term employment
in total employment in Panel A, and the ratio of xed-term over permanent employment
in Panel B. Consistent with the results reported above, we estimate an increase in the
share of xed-term workers in total (Panel A) or in permanent (Panel B) employment
after the crisis for rms with above-median nancial constraints. This is obtained for the
three measures of nancial vulnerability.
[Table 6 about here]
In sum, the results in this section are consistent with the interpretation that nancing
constraints play a role in rmsdecision in terms of employment composition and the mix
between xed-term and permanent workers. In particular, nancing constraints induced
rms to hire a larger proportion of xed-term workers relative to permanent workers after
the nancial crisis. We nd robust evidence that rms in industries with above-median
dependence on external nance increased the share of xed-term hiring contracts. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that di¢ culty in accessing capital markets following
the crisis led nancially constrained rms to place a higher value on the exibility of
xed-term workers to adjust future employment, given the higher uncertainty.
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4.3 E¤ect of the crisis on xed-term employment: worker-level
In this section we exploit worker-level information to investigate whether workers hired
by rms in industries characterized by intrinsically higher nancial vulnerability were
more likely to be hired with a xed-term contract after the crisis, relative to comparable
workers hired by rms in industries with lower nancial vulnerability. For that purpose,
we use the sample of workers that were hired during the period of analysis, and estimate
a model for the probability of a xed-term hiring contract. We estimate Eq. (2), where
the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the worker was hired with a xed-term
contract in year t, and zero if hired with a permanent contract.23 Since we include rm
or worker xed e¤ects, along with year xed e¤ects, we obtain OLS estimates given
concerns of biases arising from nonlinear estimates with xed-e¤ects. Our estimates
control for the same rm-level observable characteristics as before, and additionally for
worker characteristics: gender, educational level, skill level, experience and its square,
and whether the worker is a foreign national.
Table 7 reports results for the three measures of nancial vulnerability: external n-
ance dependence, SA index, and reliance on short-term debt. In Panel A we include rm
xed e¤ects, along with year xed e¤ects and observable rm and worker characteristics.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between the post-crisis dummy and extfin, the RZ
measure of external nance dependence, is positive and statistically signicant (columns
1 and 2). That is, workers hired by rms in industries with above-median dependence
on external nance are more likely to be employed with a xed-term contract after the
crisis, than workers hired by rms in industries with below-median dependence. The
results remain robust when we control for the real sales growth interaction. The point
estimate of 0.031 implies that the impact of the crisis was to increase the probability of a
xed-term hiring contract by 3.1 percentage points for workers hired by rms in industries
with above-median dependence on external funds, relative to comparable workers hired
by other rms. This corresponds to a 5 percent increase relative to the sample mean of
64.8 percent, reported in Table A.3.
[Table 7 about here]
Columns (3) and (4) report results for the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) SA index. We
nd that workers hired in industries where rms have a higher size-age index, and thus are
23The sample includes observations for a worker only for the years when the worker was newly hired
by a rm.
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nancially more vulnerable, were more likely to be hired with a xed-term contract after
the crisis. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term of main interest remains positive and
statistically signicant after controlling for real sales growth, and is of similar magnitude
to that for the extfin measure.
The results in columns (5) and (6) are for the measure of nancial vulnerability based
on rmsprecrisis reliance on short-term debt. Consistent with the other two measures,
we obtain a positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction with the
crisis dummy. This implies an increased probability of a xed-term hiring contract after
the crisis for workers hired by rms with heavier reliance on short-term debt.
Panel B of Table 7 presents results that control for worker xed e¤ects, in addition to
the other variables and controls discussed above. The fact that some workers were hired
more than once over the period of analysis allows us to obtain estimates that control for
potential biases arising from workersunobserved time-invariant characteristics, which
could be related to the probability of being hired with a xed-term contract. As shown,
all the results remain robust when we control for worker xed e¤ects. In particular, we
continue to nd that workers hired by rms in industries with above-median dependence
on external nance, SA index, or reliance on short-term debt were more likely to be hired
with a xed-term contract after the crisis.
In sum, the results in this section, using data at the worker-level to estimate the e¤ect
on the probability of a xed-term hiring contract, are consistent with the rm-level results
reported in the previous section. They suggest that the crisis led nancially constrained
rms to place a higher value on the exibility of xed-term workers than unconstrained
rms.
In a framework where xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but
the latter are more productive, there are two e¤ects of nancing frictions on the com-
position of employment. On the one hand, nancially constrained rms require higher
productivity, leading to an increased demand for the more productive permanent workers.
On the other hand, increased uncertainty leads to higher demand for the more exible
xed-term workers. Our results suggest that following the 2008-9 crisis rms facing n-
ancial constraints placed a higher value on the exibility of xed-term workers to adjust
future employment than on the productivity gain from hiring permanent workers. This
is of particular relevance given labor market rigidities in European countries.
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4.4 Robustness checks
4.4.1 E¤ect of the crisis on xed-term employment, by rm size
Our results reported above show that following the 2008-9 crisis, rms in industries with
higher external nance dependence increased the relative use of xed-term employment
contracts, compared to other rms. In this section we report further robustness checks
for the main results of the paper. We start by assessing the role of nancial constraints
on the share of xed-term hiring for small versus large rms. Although we already
account for the role of size and age in rmsnancial vulnerability with the SA index of
nancial constraints, here we estimate the main specications of the paper (reported in
Table 4) separately for small and for large rms. Arguably, small rms are potentially
more nancially constrained than large rms. Moreover, lending to small businesses was
signicantly reduced after the onset of the crisis in many countries.24
In Table 8 we consider the sample of micro and small rms - rms with less than
50 employees, in accordance with the Eurostat main rm size-classes. As shown, we
obtain results that are similar to those reported in Table 4 for the full sample of rms.
In particular, also for small rms, those rms with above-median nancial constraints
- measured by external nance dependence, reliance on short-term debt or SA index -
increased the relative use of xed-term workers after the crisis, compared to unconstrained
rms.
[Table 8 about here]
In Table 9 we repeat the analysis but considering the sample of medium and large
rms - those with 50 or more employees. We continue to obtain positive and statistically
signicant coe¢ cients on the Crisist  FinV ulns interaction. This nding shows that
for the sample of large rms also, the crisis had a positive di¤erential e¤ect on the share
of xed-term hires for rms with high nancing constraints, relative to those with low
constraints. We identify the role of nancing constraints through the interaction term
between the crisis dummy and the industry measures of external nance dependence;
this could explain the fact that the results are obtained for both large and small rms.
In sum, the results in this section conrm the ndings obtained previously for the full
sample of rms: nancially constrained rms increase the share of xed-term workers
disproportionately after the crisis compared to unconstrained rms.
24For example, small business loans by commercial banks fell by over $40 billion in the U.S. (Duygan-
Bump et al., 2015).
24
[Table 9 about here]
4.4.2 The 2001 ICT crisis as a placebo test
Our results on the e¤ect of the 2008-9 nancial crisis on rmsemployment decisions
are consistent with the role of shocks to credit supply. This section provides additional
evidence that our ndings are driven by di¤erential nancial dependence across industries.
We perform similar analysis to that reported in previous sections, but using the 2001
recession, which was triggered by the bursting of the bubble in the information and
communications technology (ICT) sector.25 The 2001 recession did not a¤ect rmsaccess
to credit, as the 2008-9 crisis did, and as such serves as a placebo test of our main
results if changes in xed-term employment shares are not related to nancial dependence
across industries after the ICT crisis. Therefore, we should nd no statistically signicant
di¤erential e¤ect for rms in industries with above-median nancing constraints, relative
to rms in other industries after the 2001 crisis. That is, we expect the coe¢ cient on
the interaction term Crisist  FinV ulns to be statistically insignicant for the 2001,
ICT-driven, crisis.
We estimate specications similar to Eq. (1), for our three preferred measures of
nancing constraints - extfin, SA index and short-term debt ratios - but the post-shock
dummy, Crisist, is now dened for the period after the 2001 crisis. The variable in the QP
data which distinguishes the workerscontract of employment (xed-term or permanent)
has been collected only since 2000, and the data was not collected in 2001. As such, we
use the period from 2000 to 2003 for the placebo test, and dene the Crisis2001t variable
to take the value of 1 for the years from 2001 to 2003, and zero for 2000.
Table 10 reports estimation results of similar specications as those reported in Table
4, with the main ndings of the paper, but for the 2001 crisis. We continue to control for
the same covariates and xed e¤ects as before. The dependent variable in Panel A is the
share of xed-term hires in total hires. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term between
the post-2001 crisis dummy and the measures of nancial vulnerability is statistically
insignicant (at the 5% level) for all measures. Financing constraints are thus statistically
insignicant in explaining rmsemployment mix between xed-term and permanent hires
following the 2001 crisis. This provides additional support for our main results, for the
2008-9 nancial crisis.
25Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) perform a similar robustness test.
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The dependent variable in Panel B is the ratio of xed-term over permanent hires. We
continue to obtain statistically insignicant coe¢ cients on the 2001-crisis interaction term
of interest for all measures of nancial vulnerability once we account for the sales growth
interaction (even-numbered columns). Overall, the results in this section support the
role of nancing constraints in rmsdecision of whether to hire xed-term or permanent
workers following shocks to credit supply.
[Table 10 about here]
5 Discussion
Our results show that nancing constraints play a role in rmsdecision in terms of the
optimal mix between xed-term and permanent workers after the 2008-9 crisis. In par-
ticular, nancially constrained rms increased the share of xed-term hiring contracts
following the crisis, relative to other rms. Our ndings are consistent with the hypo-
thesis that facing nancial di¢ culties in accessing capital markets following the crisis,
nancially constrained rms placed a higher value on the exibility of xed-term work-
ers than nancially unconstrained rms. Given increased uncertainty and expectation
of future nancing constraints, this type of labor allows rms to adjust future employ-
ment without incurring signicant ring costs. In this section we discuss a framework to
rationalize and interpret our results.
Caggese and Cuñat (2008) develop a model to analyze the interaction between nan-
cing constraints, ring costs and the hiring of xed-term and permanent workers. Assum-
ing that xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but permanent workers
are relatively more productive, rms without nancing constraints would hire permanent
workers up to the point where ring costs equal the productivity gain relative to xed-
term workers. The model predicts two opposing e¤ects of nancing frictions on the mix
between xed-term and permanent contracts. On the one hand, nancially constrained
rms require greater productivity to increase the value of internally generated funds; this
would lead to an increased demand for the more productive permanent workers. This
e¤ect is stronger if rms expect to be less constrained in the future. On the other hand,
cash-strapped rms with expectation of future nancing constraints value more highly
the exibility of xed-term contracts, thus increasing demand for xed-term workers.
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To assess the potential trade-o¤ between exibility and productivity in our data, we
report in Table A.6 statistics showing that xed-term workers have higher job separa-
tion rates and lower real hourly wages than permanent workers. Assuming that wages
are perfectly correlated with productivity, the lower hourly wages of xed-term workers
would reect lower productivity. To further investigate this, Table A.7 regresses labor
productivity (real sales per worker) at the rm-year level on the share of xed-term work-
ers. We use continuous xed-term employment shares or a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 for observations with above-median xed-term share, and zero otherwise.
We control for rmsobservable characteristics and include year as well as industry or
rm xed e¤ects. Although the results do not imply causality, we nd that larger shares
of xed-term workers are associated with lower sales per worker, both within rms and
across rms in an industry. In sum, in our data xed-term workers have higher job sep-
aration rates, lower real hourly wages and are associated with lower rm productivity
than permanent workers. This suggests that rms face the two opposing e¤ects of nan-
cial frictions discussed above, and the trade-o¤ between productivity and exibility when
hiring new workers.
Our empirical results shed light on these two e¤ects following a shock to credit supply.
The nding that after the 2008 crisis nancially constrained rms increase the propor-
tion of xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires suggests that they value the
exibility of xed-term workers more highly than the larger productivity of permanent
workers.26 Future expected nancing constraints are an important determinant of em-
ployment decisions, and nancial frictions increase expected ring costs, inducing rms
to hire xed-term instead of permanent workers. This is particularly important given
labor market rigidities in Europe, since xed-term contracts o¤er the exibility to adjust
future employment without incurring signicant ring costs.27
The results in our paper have important policy implications given that xed-term
26Our results are consistent with the ndings of Caggese and Cuñat (2008) for Italy over the 1990-2000
period.
27Since the wages of xed-term workers are on average lower, nancially constrained rms might hire
relatively more xed-term workers after the crisis also to reduce labor costs. This hypothesis is hard to
establish conclusively and that is beyond the scope of this paper. Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé (2016)
show that part-time employment is countercyclical and increased markedly in the U.S. and U.K. in the
aftermath of the 2008-9 crisis. This is consistent with employers reducing labor costs during downturns
by moving some full-time employees to part-time jobs. We instead focus on the choice between xed-
term and permanent workers, both of which are predominantly on full-time jobs in Portugal (average
weekly hours are 39 and 40, respectively, and did not change signicantly over the period). As discussed
in Bentolila et al. (2012), Booth et al. (2012), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), among many others,
xed-term contracts are a mechanism that enhances labor market exibility, allowing rms to adjust the
workforce by varying the number of temporary workers. Our results show that Portuguese rms used
this mechanism following the 2008 crisis.
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workers tend to earn lower wages and move from one contract to another with repeated
spells of unemployment. These contracts a¤ect mostly young, women and less educated
workers (see e.g. Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Portugal and Varejão, 2009). The nding
that the use of this type of contract increased after the crisis implies on the one hand
that their availability allowed rms to continue to hire in an uncertain environment given
their exibility. On the other hand, the increase in xed-term employment may uncover
additional costs of the shock with potential long-term e¤ects in terms of exposure to labor
market frictions and decreased accumulation of human capital.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how the nancial crisis of 2008-9, and the resulting nancing
constraints imposed on rms, a¤ected rmsdecision in terms of employment composition,
when xed-term and permanent contracts are available when hiring new workers. Labor
market responses to the crisis have been large in European labor markets, characterized
by strict employment protection for regular contracts and by exible temporary contracts.
However, evidence on the e¤ects of nancial constraints, and in particular of the recent
crisis, on rmsdecision regarding the composition of employment, and the mix between
xed-term and permanent workers is very scant.
We exploit the 2008-9 crisis, which a¤ected rms di¤erently according to their precrisis
dependence on external nance, as a quasi-natural experiment. We study the link between
nancing constraints and the proportion of xed-term hires with respect to permanent
hires within rms. We also estimate, at the worker level, the e¤ect of nancing constraints
on the probability of a xed-term hiring contract after the crisis.
We use employer-employee data for the universe of private sector rms and workers in
Portugal for our analysis. Credit supply e¤ects are identied by industry-level external
nance dependence (following Rajan and Zingales, 1998), the Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
size-age index of nancial constraints, and reliance on short-term debt. These measures
are computed over the precrisis period, to avoid changes in rm behavior after the crisis
to a¤ect the measures of nancial vulnerability.
We nd that rms in industries with above-median dependence on external nance in-
crease the share of xed-term hires with respect to permanent hires after the 2008-9 crisis,
relative to rms with below-median external nance needs. We account for rmsxed
e¤ects, which absorb unobserved characteristics and any systematic di¤erences across
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rms, and for aggregate trends. Our results are robust for the Hadlock and Pierce (2010)
size-age index and for precrisis reliance on short-term debt. At the worker-level, workers
employed by rms in industries with above-median nancial vulnerability are more likely
to be hired with a xed-term contract after the crisis, relative to comparable workers
hired by unconstrained rms.
In a framework where xed-term and permanent workers are perfect substitutes but
permanent workers are more productive, there are two e¤ects of nancing frictions on
the composition of employment. On the one hand, nancially constrained rms require
higher productivity, and thus demand more permanent workers. On the other hand,
expectation of future nancing constraints leads to higher demand for the more exible
xed-term workers (Caggese and Cuñat, 2008). Our nding that following the 2008-9
crisis nancially constrained rms increase the share of xed-term hires suggests that
they value the exibility of xed-term labor more highly since it allows them to adjust
future employment given a negative shock.
Whilst our ndings are based on micro-level data, they have broader relevance and
policy implications. Financial constraints and the availability of credit are important
determinants of rmsemployment decisions. Empirical research has found that xed-
term workers earn lower wages and have repeated spells of unemployment. The nding
that the use of these contracts increased after the crisis suggests, on the one hand, that
their availability allowed rms to continue to hire in an uncertain environment given their
exibility. On the other hand, it may uncover additional costs of the shock with potential
long-term e¤ects in terms of decreased accumulation of human capital and productivity.
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8 Tables
Table 1: Hiring per year and share of xed-term hires
Year Fixed-term+Permanent hires % Fixed-term
2003 355,794 60.87
2004 383,770 62.32
2005 464,490 63.31
2006 487,213 64.02
2007 554,589 65.32
2008 574,961 68.48
2009 466,728 66.98
2010 436,837 54.24
2011 405,874 55.73
2012 291,372 58.47
The Table reports the number of xed-term and permanent work-
ers hired each year and the share of xed-term hires. Own calcu-
lations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
Table 2: E¤ect of the crisis on rm-level employment
Dependent variable: ln(employment)jt
(1) (2)
Crisis -0.041*** -0.060***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant -4.089*** -0.233***
(0.012) (0.014)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Industry FE yes
Firm FE yes
R2 0.568 0.060
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012 and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at
the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: E¤ect of the crisis and of nancial vulnerability on employment level
Dependent variable: Panel A: ln(employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Crisis -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.103*** -0.115*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.056***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.001 -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Crisis Salesgab-med 0.015*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.058*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant -0.235*** -0.230*** -0.233*** -0.230*** -0.236*** -0.229*** -0.233*** -0.229*** -0.233*** -0.232***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.061
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Dependent variable: Panel B: ln(employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio TCRED TANG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.065*** 0.068*** -0.001 -0.051*** -0.038*** -0.037***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Crisis Salesgab-med 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.056*** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant -0.210*** -0.206*** -0.208*** -0.206*** -0.212*** -0.205*** -0.209*** -0.205*** -0.208*** -0.207***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are calculated over the
precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not
nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Ra jan and Zingales, 1998). TCRED measures access to supplier credit and
is the ratio of total accounts payable over cost of goods sold. TANG measures tangible assets and is the share of net plant,
property and equipment in total book assets. SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the rms
ination-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm (windsorized
at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period
(2002-2006) following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the
average for each rm over the period and then take the industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med
(Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinV uln (Sales growth) measure,
and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.007** -0.013*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Nb. Obs. 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term hires/Permanent hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.501*** 0.354*** 0.722** 0.862** 0.559*** 0.386**
(0.176) (0.131) (0.323) (0.370) (0.212) (0.160)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.573*** -0.793*** -0.538***
(0.197) (0.279) (0.179)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Nb. Obs. 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share
of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the rms ination-
adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm
(windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also
calculated over the precrisis period (2002-2006), following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other
nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm over the period and then take
the industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if
the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise.
Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires; alternative dependent
variables (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Permanent hires/Employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.001 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Dependent variable: Panel C: (Nb. xed-term workers hired)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.093** 0.090*** 0.045 0.045 0.114** 0.117***
(0.043) (0.035) (0.068) (0.068) (0.048) (0.038)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.009 -0.035 0.007
(0.042) (0.049) (0.038)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Dependent variable: Panel D: (Nb. permanent workers hired)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med -0.095** -0.054 -0.279*** -0.280*** -0.119** -0.070*
(0.045) (0.034) (0.080) (0.080) (0.055) (0.042)
Crisis Salesgab-med 0.148*** 0.165*** 0.139***
(0.046) (0.055) (0.040)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Notes as in Table 4.
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Table 6: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term employment (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term employment/Total employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term employment/Permanent employment)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.050*** 0.034*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.053***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.056*** -0.067*** -0.047***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Nb. Obs. 1,837,439 1,837,439 1,837,439 1,837,439 1,837,439 1,837,439
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of
total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales,
1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the rms ination-adjusted book
assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm (windsorized at
37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the
precrisis period (2002-2006), following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other nancial vulnerability
measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm over the period and then take the industry-level median
of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the
median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered
at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
37
Table 7: E¤ect of the crisis on the probability of xed-term hiring contract
(worker-level)
Panel A: Firm xed e¤ects (LPM)
Dependent variable: Probability[Fixed-term hiring contract]it
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.036***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.042***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Additional worker controls gender, experience, experience2, education, skill-level, foreign
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.034
Nb. Obs. 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322
Panel B: Worker xed e¤ects (LPM)
Dependent variable: Probability[Fixed-term hiring contract]it
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.063*** 0.035*** 0.080*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.058***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Additional worker controls experience, experience2, skill-level
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure, region, industry
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Worker FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.049 0.050
Nb. Obs. 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322 3,423,322
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are calculated
over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital
expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the
Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the rms ination-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion
euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term
debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002-2006), following the same
methodology as in RZ and for the other nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm
over the period and then take the industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med)
takes the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero
otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires; sub-sample of micro and
small rms (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.004 -0.010*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Nb. Obs. 686,323 686,323 686,323 686,323 686,323 686,323
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term hires/Permanent hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.101*** 0.093*** 0.026 0.036 0.056** 0.042*
(0.027) (0.026) (0.039) (0.042) (0.028) (0.025)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.028 -0.059* -0.039
(0.027) (0.031) (0.025)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Nb. Obs. 371,585 371,585 371,585 371,585 371,585 371,585
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share
of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the rms ination-
adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the
rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure
is also calculated over the precrisis period (2002-2006), following the same methodology as in RZ and for
the other nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm over the period and
then take the industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med) takes the
value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and
zero otherwise. The estimation sample includes rms with less than 50 workers in the rst year they are
observed in the sample. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10;
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires; sub-sample of medium and
large rms (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.042*** -0.054*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.026
Nb. Obs. 47,851 47,851 47,851 47,851 47,851 47,851
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term hires/Permanent hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 3.071** 2.491** 3.795* 5.421** 3.651** 3.398**
(1.459) (1.267) (2.046) (2.639) (1.660) (1.570)
Crisis Salesgab-med -5.728*** -7.220*** -5.824***
(2.049) (2.747) (2.096)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008
Nb. Obs. 28,718 28,718 28,718 28,718 28,718 28,718
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share
of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index where size is the rms ination-
adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm
(windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also
calculated over the precrisis period (2002-2006), following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other
nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm over the period and then take the
industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if the
industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. The
estimation sample includes rms with 50 or more workers in the rst year they are observed in the sample.
Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table 10: E¤ect of the 2001 ICT crisis on the share of xed-term hires (rm-level)
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.004 0.012* 0.010* 0.007 -0.011* -0.010*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Crisis Salesgab-med 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Nb. Obs. 159,253 159,253 159,253 159,253 159,253 159,253
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term hires/Permanent hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.061 0.073 0.360** 0.362* 0.256 0.257
(0.124) (0.118) (0.174) (0.192) (0.164) (0.163)
Crisis Salesgab-med 0.050 -0.014 0.038
(0.172) (0.191) (0.172)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Nb. Obs. 101,884 101,884 101,884 101,884 101,884 101,884
The analysis in this table covers the period 2000-2003, as the data distinguishes between xed-term
and permanent employment contracts only since 2000 (the data were not collected in 2001). Crisis
takes the value of 1 from 2002 onwards, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the pre-2001 crisis period (1997-2000). EXTFIN measures the dependence on external
nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from
operations. SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the rms ination-
adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of
the rm (windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. FinV ulnab-med
( Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if the sector is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln
(Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported
in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics, employment shares
All rms Hiring Firms
Year Nb. of rms FoT FoP FoTH FoPH FhoT PhoT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2003 196,887 0.127 0.322 0.496 0.917 0.047 0.049
2004 211,981 0.135 0.348 0.509 1.022 0.050 0.050
2005 222,591 0.144 0.352 0.517 1.130 0.054 0.052
2006 232,946 0.147 0.371 0.538 1.203 0.056 0.049
2007 237,089 0.163 0.413 0.551 1.353 0.063 0.053
2008 244,558 0.170 0.441 0.577 1.472 0.066 0.049
2009 246,912 0.172 0.434 0.586 1.230 0.055 0.041
2010 212,150 0.124 0.283 0.522 0.960 0.052 0.049
2011 219,554 0.139 0.309 0.556 1.024 0.053 0.044
2012 211,270 0.143 0.316 0.585 0.976 0.048 0.036
The statistics are for the rm-level estimation sample, with 2,235,938 rm-year ob-
servations. FoT is the share of xed-term over total employment; FoP is the ratio of
xed-term over permanent employment. FoTH and FoPH are the share of xed-term
hires in total or in permanent hires, respectively. FhoT and PhoT are the share of
xed-term and permanent hires, respectively, over total employment within the rm.
The table reports averages across rms. Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS
(2002-2012).
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics - rm-level estimation samplesmeans
Dependent variable: FoT FoP FoTH FoPH FhoT PhoT Nb. FT
hires
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean of dependent variable 0.148 0.361 0.544 1.143 0.055 0.047 0.994
extn 0.532 0.517 0.506 0.490 0.532 0.532 0.532
tcred 2.294 2.252 2.307 2.321 2.294 2.294 2.294
tang 0.314 0.324 0.342 0.353 0.314 0.314 0.314
SA index -7.229 -7.235 -7.240 -7.248 -7.229 -7.229 -7.229
Short-term debt ratio 0.956 0.956 0.955 0.953 0.956 0.956 0.956
extnab-med 0.498 0.485 0.471 0.450 0.498 0.498 0.498
tcredab-med 0.458 0.453 0.483 0.493 0.458 0.458 0.458
tangab-med 0.145 0.159 0.178 0.197 0.145 0.145 0.145
SA indexab-med 0.737 0.733 0.724 0.718 0.737 0.737 0.737
Short-term debt ratioab-med 0.596 0.588 0.567 0.546 0.596 0.596 0.596
Crisis 0.507 0.510 0.490 0.473 0.507 0.507 0.507
ln(sales)t 1 11.984 12.144 12.716 12.731 11.984 11.984 11.984
Legal nature
individual name 0.212 0.218 0.138 0.141 0.212 0.212 0.212
uniperson quota society 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
anonymous society 0.037 0.042 0.073 0.077 0.037 0.037 0.037
singular person 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.011
other 0.025 0.028 0.037 0.033 0.025 0.025 0.025
Ownership
public 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
foreign 0.046 0.050 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.046 0.046
Multi-establishment 0.083 0.092 0.141 0.137 0.083 0.083 0.083
Nb. Obs. 2,235,938 1,837,439 734,174 400,303 2,235,938 2,235,938 2,235,938
The table reports means (proportions) of the dependent variable and of the covariates for the estimation sample with
the dependent variable in the rst row; e.g. the share of xed-term employment in total employment (FoT, column 1);
xed-term over permanent employment (FoP, column 2); xed-term hires in total hires (FoTH, column 3); xed-term hires
in permanent hires (FoPH, column 4). The size of the estimation sample varies with the dependent variable under analysis.
Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics - worker-level estimation sample means
Variable Mean
Fixed-term contract 0.648
extn 0.498
tcred 3.140
tang 0.329
SA index -7.209
Short-term debt ratio 0.962
extnab-med 0.399
tcredab-med 0.583
tangab-med 0.159
SA indexab-med 0.581
Short-term debt ratioab-med 0.461
Crisis 0.516
Female 0.450
Experience 15.920
Educational level
secondary 0.289
high-school 0.248
university 0.120
Skill level
medium 0.328
high 0.131
Foreign national 0.093
ln(sales)t 1 14.871
Legal nature
individual name 0.047
uniperson quota society 0.025
anonymous society 0.296
singular person 0.001
other 0.048
Ownership
public 0.014
foreign 0.139
Multi-establishment 0.426
Nb. Obs. 3,423,322
The statistics are for the worker-level estimation
sample, which uses observations only for the year a
worker is newly hired in a rm. Own calculations
based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
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Table A.4: Precrisis share of permanent workers hired (rm-level)
Dependent variable: (Permanent hires/Employment)j;precrisis
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FinV uln 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.094***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
FinV ulnab-med 0.006*** 0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.232*** 0.095*** 0.011 0.096***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Additional controls median sales growth, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure, region
R2 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.023 0.021
Nb. Obs. 402,683 402,683 402,683 402,683 402,683 402,683
The dependent variable is the precrisis (2002-2007) average share of permanent hires in total employment
for each rm. The nancial vulnerability measures are also calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN
measures the dependence on external nance and is the share of total capital expenditure that is not
nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock
& Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the rms ination-adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1
billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm (windsorized at 37). The short-term debt
ratio is short-term debt/total debt. We then construct the indicator variables for above-median nancial
vulnerability, which take the value of 1 if the industry is above the median of the respective FinVuln
measure, and zero otherwise. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. *
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.5: E¤ect of the crisis on the share of xed-term hires (rm-level); industry
xed-e¤ects
Dependent variable: Panel A: (Fixed-term hires/Total hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
Nb. Obs. 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174 734,174
Dependent variable: Panel B: (Fixed-term hires/Permanent hires)jt
Fin.Vuln. measure: EXTFIN SA index ST debt ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis FinV ulnab-med 0.309*** 0.241*** 0.344** 0.386** 0.299*** 0.213**
(0.094) (0.071) (0.172) (0.187) (0.113) (0.085)
Crisis Salesgab-med -0.252** -0.355*** -0.241***
(0.100) (0.133) (0.091)
Additional rm controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-establishment, ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Nb. Obs. 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303 400,303
Crisis takes the value of 1 from 2008 to 2012, and zero otherwise. The nancial vulnerability measures are
calculated over the precrisis period. EXTFIN measures the dependence on external nance and is the share
of total capital expenditure that is not nanced by internal cash ows from operations (as in Rajan and
Zingales, 1998). SA index is the Hadlock & Pierce (2010) size-age index, where size is the rms ination-
adjusted book assets (windsorized at 4.1 billion euro) and age is the number of years of existence of the rm
(windsorized at 37). Short-term debt ratio is short-term debt/total debt. The sales growth measure is also
calculated over the precrisis period (2002-2006) following the same methodology as in RZ and for the other
nancial vulnerability measures. We rst calculate the average for each rm over the period and then take
the industry-level median of the rm-level averages. FinV ulnab-med ( Salesgab-med) takes the value of 1 if
the industry is above the median of the corresponding FinVuln (Sales growth) measure, and zero otherwise.
Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Separation rates and hourly wages of xed-term and permanent workers
Job separation rates Hourly wage
year Fixed-term Permanent Fixed-term Permanent
2002 34.74 16.77 4.75 6.01
2003 35.37 16.79 4.73 5.97
2004 35.10 16.80 4.80 6.16
2005 34.85 15.32 4.93 6.23
2006 35.44 14.36 4.88 6.25
2007 35.96 15.10 4.89 6.29
2008 36.37 14.78 5.06 6.40
2009 37.57 17.98 5.29 6.73
2010 36.43 15.47 4.97 6.51
2011 37.52 17.40 4.86 6.44
The table reports average separation rates and hourly wage for xed-term and
permanent workers in each year. Separation rates are not dened for 2012, the
last year of our sample. Own calculations based on Portugal, MTSS (2002-2012).
Table A.7: Productivity e¤ect of xed-term workers (rm-level)
Dependent variable: (sales/employment)jt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed-termshare -0.013*** -0.150***
(0.004) (0.006)
Fixed-termshareab-med -0.267*** -0.217***
(0.003) (0.003)
Additional controls ln(sales)t 1, multi-estab., ownership, legal structure
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
R2 0.322 0.337 0.010 0.023
Nb. Obs. 757,043 757,043 757,043 757,043
The dependent variable is labor productivity (measured by sales per worker). Fixed-term
share is the share of xed-term workers by rm-year. The estimation period is precrisis,
over 2002-2006. Standard errors, clustered at the rm level, are reported in parentheses.
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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